Internet-Draft HiAE July 2025
Denis, et al. Expires 14 January 2026 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-pham-cfrg-hiae-latest
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
F. Denis
Fastly Inc.
P. Pham
Huawei
L. Prabel
Huawei
S. Sun
Huawei

The HiAE Authenticated Encryption Algorithm

Abstract

This document describes HiAE, a high-throughput authenticated encryption algorithm designed for next-generation wireless systems (6G) and high-speed data transmission applications.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/hiae-aead/draft-pham-hiae.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 January 2026.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The evolution of wireless networks toward 6G, alongside the growing demands of cloud service providers and CDN operators, requires cryptographic algorithms capable of delivering unprecedented throughput while maintaining strong security guarantees. Current high-performance authenticated encryption schemes achieve impressive speeds by leveraging platform-specific SIMD instructions, particularly AES-NI on x86 architectures [AES-NI]. Notable examples include AEGIS [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead], SNOW-V [SNOW-V], and Rocca-S [ROCCA-S].

While these platform-specific optimizations deliver high performance on their target architectures, they create a significant performance disparity across different hardware platforms. These algorithms excel on x86 processors equipped with AES-NI but exhibit substantially degraded performance on ARM architectures that implement SIMD functionality through NEON instructions. This inconsistency poses a critical challenge for modern network deployments where ARM processors dominate mobile devices, edge computing nodes, and increasingly, data center environments.

The architectural differences between x86 and ARM extend beyond instruction set variations. They encompass fundamental distinctions in how AES round functions are implemented in hardware, pipeline structures, and memory subsystems. These differences mean that algorithms optimized for one architecture may inadvertently create bottlenecks on another, resulting in unpredictable performance characteristics across heterogeneous deployments.

The transition to 6G networks amplifies these challenges. Next-generation wireless systems will rely heavily on software-defined networking (SDN) and cloud radio access networks (Cloud RAN), requiring cryptographic algorithms that perform consistently across diverse hardware platforms. The stringent latency requirements and massive data rates anticipated for 6G, potentially exceeding 1 Tbps, demand encryption schemes that can leverage the full capabilities of both x86 and ARM architectures without compromise.

This document presents HiAE (High-throughput Authenticated Encryption), an authenticated encryption algorithm explicitly designed to address these cross-platform performance challenges. Through careful algorithmic design, HiAE delivers superior performance compared to existing high-throughput algorithms on both x86 and ARM architectures by efficiently utilizing the capabilities of each platform without being overly dependent on architecture-specific features.

The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes notation and conventions. Section 3 provides the complete specification of the HiAE algorithm, including its three operational modes. Sections 4–6 detail the specific use cases as an AEAD cipher, stream cipher, and MAC. Section 7 analyzes security considerations, while Section 8 discusses implementation aspects. The appendix provides comprehensive test vectors for validation.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Throughout this document, “byte” is used interchangeably with “octet” and refers to an 8-bit sequence.

Basic operations:

Data manipulation:

Cryptographic operations:

Control flow and comparison:

AES blocks:

The constants C0 and C1 are domain separation constants derived from the fractional parts of π and e, respectively.

Input and output values:

3. The HiAE Algorithm

This section provides the complete specification of HiAE. The algorithm operates on a 2048-bit internal state organized as sixteen 128-bit blocks, combining AES round functions with an efficient update mechanism to achieve both high security and cross-platform performance.

3.1. Algorithm Parameters

HiAE maintains a 2048-bit state organized as sixteen 128-bit blocks denoted {S0, S1, S2, ..., S15}. Each block Si represents a 128-bit AES state that can be processed independently by AES round functions. This large state size provides security margins while enabling efficient parallel processing on modern architectures.

The parameters for this algorithm, whose meaning is defined in [RFC5116], Section 4, are:

  • K_LEN (key length) is 32 bytes (256 bits).

  • P_MAX (maximum length of the plaintext) is 261 - 1 bytes (264 - 8 bits).

  • A_MAX (maximum length of the associated data) is 261 - 1 bytes (264 - 8 bits).

  • N_MIN (minimum nonce length) = N_MAX (maximum nonce length) = 16 bytes (128 bits).

  • C_MAX (maximum ciphertext length) = P_MAX + tag length = (261 - 1) + 16 or 32 bytes (in bits: (264 - 8) + 128 bits).

Distinct associated data inputs, as described in [RFC5116], Section 3, MUST be unambiguously encoded as a single input. It is up to the application to create a structure in the associated data input if needed.

3.2. Authenticated Encryption 

Encrypt(msg, ad, key, nonce)

The Encrypt function encrypts a message and returns the ciphertext along with an authentication tag that verifies the authenticity of the message and associated data, if provided.

Security:

  • For a given key, the nonce MUST NOT be reused under any circumstances; doing so allows an attacker to recover the internal state.

  • The key MUST be randomly chosen from a uniform distribution.

Inputs:

  • msg: the message to be encrypted (length MUST be less than or equal to P_MAX).

  • ad: the associated data to authenticate (length MUST be less than or equal to A_MAX).

  • key: the encryption key.

  • nonce: the public nonce.

Outputs:

  • ct: the ciphertext.

  • tag: the authentication tag.

Steps:

Init(key, nonce)

ct = {}

ad_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ad, 128), 128)
for ai in ad_blocks:
    Absorb(ai)

msg_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(msg, 128), 128)
for xi in msg_blocks:
    ct = ct || Enc(xi)

tag = Finalize(|ad|, |msg|)
ct = Truncate(ct, |msg|)

return ct and tag

3.3. Authenticated Decryption 

Decrypt(ct, tag, ad, key, nonce)

The Decrypt function decrypts a ciphertext, verifies that the authentication tag is correct, and returns the message on success or an error if tag verification fails.

Security:

  • If tag verification fails, the decrypted message and incorrect authentication tag MUST NOT be given as output. The decrypted message MUST be overwritten with zeros before the function returns.

  • The comparison of the input tag with the expected_tag MUST be done in constant time.

Inputs:

  • ct: the ciphertext to decrypt (length MUST be less than or equal to C_MAX).

  • tag: the authentication tag.

  • ad: the associated data to authenticate (length MUST be less than or equal to A_MAX).

  • key: the encryption key.

  • nonce: the public nonce.

Outputs:

  • Either the decrypted message msg or an error indicating that the authentication tag is invalid for the given inputs.

Steps:

Init(key, nonce)

msg = {}

ad_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ad, 128), 128)
for ai in ad_blocks:
    Absorb(ai)

ct_blocks = Split(ct, 128)
cn = Tail(ct, |ct| mod 128)

for ci in ct_blocks:
    msg = msg || Dec(ci)

if cn is not empty:
    msg = msg || DecPartial(cn)

expected_tag = Finalize(|ad|, |msg|)

if CtEq(tag, expected_tag) is False:
    erase msg
    erase expected_tag
    return "verification failed" error
else:
    return msg

3.4. Core Functions

The following sections describe the fundamental operations that form the building blocks of HiAE. These functions manipulate the 2048-bit state to provide confusion, diffusion, and the absorption of input data.

3.4.1. The State Rotation Function 

Rol()

The Rol function provides diffusion by rotating the sixteen 128-bit blocks of the state one position to the left. This ensures that local changes propagate throughout the entire state over multiple rounds.

Modifies:

  • {S0, ...S15}: the state.

Steps:

  t = S0
 S0 = S1
 S1 = S2
 S2 = S3
 S3 = S4
 S4 = S5
 S5 = S6
 S6 = S7
 S7 = S8
 S8 = S9
 S9 = S10
S10 = S11
S11 = S12
S12 = S13
S13 = S14
S14 = S15
S15 = t

3.4.2. The State Update Functions

The state update functions form the cryptographic core of HiAE. They combine the AESL transformation with XOR operations and state rotation to achieve both security and efficiency.

3.4.2.1. The Update Function 
Update(xi)

The Update function is the core of the HiAE algorithm. It updates the state {S0, ...S15} using a 128-bit value.

Inputs:

  • xi: the 128-bit block to be absorbed.

Modifies:

  • {S0, ...S15}: the state.

Steps:

  t = AESL(S0 ^ S1) ^ xi
 S0 = AESL(S13) ^ t
 S3 =  S3 ^ xi
S13 = S13 ^ xi

Rol()
3.4.2.2. The UpdateEnc Function 
UpdateEnc(mi)

The UpdateEnc function extends the basic Update function to provide encryption. It absorbs a plaintext block while simultaneously generating the corresponding ciphertext block through an additional XOR with state block S9.

Inputs:

  • mi: a 128-bit block to be encrypted.

Outputs:

  • ci: the encrypted 128-bit block.

Modifies:

  • {S0, ...S15}: the state.

Steps:

  t = AESL(S0 ^ S1) ^ mi
 ci = t ^ S9
 S0 = AESL(S13) ^ t
 S3 =  S3 ^ mi
S13 = S13 ^ mi

Rol()

return ci
3.4.2.3. The UpdateDec Function 
UpdateDec(ci)

The UpdateDec function provides the inverse operation of UpdateEnc. It processes a ciphertext block to recover the plaintext while maintaining the same state update pattern, ensuring that encryption and decryption produce identical internal states.

Inputs:

  • ci: a 128-bit block to be decrypted.

Outputs:

  • mi: the decrypted 128-bit block.

Modifies:

  • {S0, ...S15}: the state.

Steps:

  t = ci ^ S9
 mi = AESL(S0 ^ S1) ^ t
 S0 = AESL(S13) ^ t
 S3 =  S3 ^ mi
S13 = S13 ^ mi

Rol()

return mi
3.4.2.4. The Diffuse Function 
Diffuse(x)

The Diffuse function ensures full state mixing by performing 32 consecutive update operations. This function is critical for security during initialization and finalization phases, guaranteeing that every bit of the key and nonce influences the entire state, and that the authentication tag depends on all state bits.

Inputs:

  • x: a 128-bit input value.

Modifies:

  • {S0, ...S15}: the state.

Steps:

Repeat(32,
  Update(x)
)

3.5. Initialization and Processing Functions

The following functions implement the high-level operations of HiAE: initialization, data absorption, encryption/decryption, and finalization.

3.5.1. The Init Function 

Init(key, nonce)

The Init function constructs the initial state {S0, ...S15} from the encryption key and nonce. The initialization process carefully distributes key material across the state and applies the Diffuse function to ensure all state bits are cryptographically mixed before processing begins.

Inputs:

  • key: the encryption key.

  • nonce: the public nonce.

Defines:

  • {S0, ...S15}: the initial state.

Steps:

k0, k1 = Split(key, 128)

 S0 = C0
 S1 = k1
 S2 = nonce
 S3 = C0
 S4 = ZeroPad({ 0 }, 128)
 S5 = nonce ^ k0
 S6 = ZeroPad({ 0 }, 128)
 S7 = C1
 S8 = nonce ^ k1
 S9 = ZeroPad({ 0 }, 128)
S10 = k1
S11 = C0
S12 = C1
S13 = k1
S14 = ZeroPad({ 0 }, 128)
S15 = C0 ^ C1

Diffuse(C0)

 S9 =  S9 ^ k0
S13 = S13 ^ k1

3.5.2. The Absorb Function 

Absorb(ai)

The Absorb function processes associated data by incorporating 128-bit blocks into the internal state. This function is used exclusively for authenticated data that should influence the authentication tag but not produce ciphertext output.

Inputs:

  • ai: the 128-bit input block.

Steps:

Update(ai)

3.5.3. The Enc Function 

Enc(mi)

The Enc function encrypts a single 128-bit plaintext block. It serves as a simple wrapper around UpdateEnc, providing a clean interface for the block-by-block encryption process.

Inputs:

  • mi: the 128-bit input block.

Outputs:

  • ci: the 128-bit encrypted block.

Steps:

ci = UpdateEnc(mi)
return ci

3.5.4. The Dec Function 

Dec(ci)

The Dec function decrypts a single 128-bit ciphertext block. Like Enc, it provides a clean interface by wrapping the UpdateDec function.

Inputs:

  • ci: the 128-bit encrypted block.

Outputs:

  • mi: the 128-bit decrypted block.

Steps:

mi = UpdateDec(ci)
return mi

3.5.5. The DecPartial Function 

DecPartial(cn)

The DecPartial function handles the special case of decrypting a partial block at the end of a ciphertext. This function carefully reconstructs the keystream to decrypt blocks smaller than 128 bits while maintaining the same state evolution as encryption.

Inputs:

  • cn: the encrypted input.

Outputs:

  • mn: the decryption of cn.

Steps:

# Step 1: Recover the keystream that would encrypt a full zero block
ks = AESL(S0 ^ S1) ^ ZeroPad(cn) ^ S9

# Step 2: Construct a full 128-bit ciphertext block
# by appending the appropriate keystream bits
ci = cn || Tail(ks, 128 - |cn|)

# Step 3: Decrypt the full block using standard UpdateDec
mi = UpdateDec(ci)

# Step 4: Extract only the decrypted bytes corresponding to the partial input
mn = Truncate(mi, |cn|)

return mn

3.5.6. The Finalize Function 

Finalize(ad_len_bits, msg_len_bits)

The Finalize function completes the authentication process by generating a 128-bit tag. It incorporates the lengths of both the associated data and message (each encoded as 8 bytes in little-endian format), applies the Diffuse function for final mixing, and combines all state blocks to produce the authentication tag.

Inputs:

  • ad_len_bits: the length of the associated data in bits.

  • msg_len_bits: the length of the message in bits.

Outputs:

  • tag: the authentication tag.

Steps:

t = (LE64(ad_len_bits) || LE64(msg_len_bits))
Diffuse(t)

tag = S0 ^ S1 ^ S2 ^ S3 ^ S4 ^ S5 ^ S6 ^ S7 ^
      S8 ^ S9 ^ S10 ^ S11 ^ S12 ^ S13 ^ S14 ^ S15

return tag

4. Encoding (ct, tag) Tuples

Applications MAY keep the ciphertext and the authentication tag in distinct structures or encode both as a single string.

In the latter case, the tag MUST immediately follow the ciphertext:

combined_ct = ct || tag

5. Alternative Operating Modes

While HiAE is primarily designed as an authenticated encryption algorithm, its flexible structure allows it to operate in two additional modes: as a stream cipher for keystream generation and as a message authentication code (MAC) for data authentication without encryption.

5.1. HiAE as a Stream Cipher

The stream cipher mode of HiAE generates a keystream by encrypting an all-zero message.

Stream(len, key, nonce)

The Stream function expands a key and an optional nonce into a variable-length keystream.

Inputs:

  • len: the length of the keystream to generate in bits.

  • key: the HiAE key.

  • nonce: the HiAE nonce. If unspecified, it is set to N_MAX zero bytes.

Outputs:

  • stream: the keystream.

Steps:

if len == 0:
    return {}
else:
    stream, tag = Encrypt(ZeroPad({ 0 }, len), {}, key, nonce)
    return stream

This is equivalent to encrypting a message of len zero bits without associated data and discarding the authentication tag.

Instead of relying on the generic Encrypt function, implementations can omit the Finalize function.

After initialization, the Update function is called with constant parameters, allowing further optimizations.

5.2. HiAE as a Message Authentication Code

In MAC mode, HiAE processes input data without generating ciphertext, producing only an authentication tag. This mode is useful when data authenticity is required without confidentiality.

Mac(data, key, nonce)

Security:

  • This is the only function that allows the reuse of (key, nonce) pairs with different inputs.

  • HiAE-based MAC functions MUST NOT be used as hash functions: if the key is known, inputs causing state collisions can easily be crafted.

  • Unlike hash-based MACs, tags MUST NOT be used for key derivation as there is no guarantee that they are uniformly random.

Inputs:

  • data: the input data to authenticate (length MUST be less than or equal to A_MAX).

  • key: the secret key.

  • nonce: the public nonce.

Outputs:

  • tag: the authentication tag.

Steps:

Init(key, nonce)
data_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(data, 128), 128)
for di in data_blocks:
    Absorb(di)
tag = Finalize(|data|, 0)
return tag

6. Security Considerations

6.1. Classic Setting

HiAE provides 256-bit security against key recovery and state recovery attacks, along with 128-bit security for integrity against forgery attempts.

It is important to note that the encryption security assumes the attacker cannot successfully forge messages through repeated trials [HiAE-Clarification].

Regarding keystream bias attacks, analysis shows that at least 150-bit security is guaranteed by HiAE.

Finally, HiAE is assumed to be secure against key-committing attacks, but it has not been proven to be secure in the everything-committing setting.

6.2. Quantum Setting

HiAE targets a security strength of 128 bits against key recovery attacks and forgery attacks in the quantum setting. Security is not claimed against online superposition queries to cryptographic oracle attacks, as such attacks are highly impractical in real-world applications.

6.3. Attack Considerations

HiAE is assumed to be secure against the following attacks:

  1. Key-Recovery Attack: 256-bit security against key recovery attacks.

  2. Differential Attack: 256-bit security against differential attacks in the initialization phase.

  3. Forgery Attack: 128-bit security against forgery attacks.

  4. Integral Attack: Secure against integral attacks.

  5. State-Recovery Attack:

    • Guess-and-Determine Attack: The time complexity of the guess-and-determine attack cannot be lower than 2256.

    • Algebraic Attack: The system of equations to recover HiAE states cannot be solved with time complexity lower than 2256.

  6. Linear Bias: At least 150-bit security against statistical attacks.

  7. Key-Committing Attacks: Secure in the FROB, CMT1, and CMT2 models.

  8. Everything-Committing Attacks: Security is not claimed in the CMT3 model.

The details of the cryptanalysis can be found in the paper [HiAE].

7. Implementation Considerations

HiAE is designed to balance the performance of XOR and AES instructions across both ARM and x86 architectures while being optimized to push performance to its limits. The algorithm’s XAXX structure enables platform-specific optimizations by exploiting the fundamental differences in how ARM and Intel processors implement AES round functions.

7.1. Platform-Specific Optimizations

The key to HiAE’s cross-platform efficiency lies in understanding how different architectures implement AES operations.

7.1.1. ARM NEON Architecture

On ARM processors with NEON SIMD extensions, the most efficient pattern for combining AES operations with XOR is:

z ^ AESL(x)

This pattern is implemented as a fused operation using ARM cryptographic extensions:

vaesmcq_u8(vaeseq_u8(z, x))

This SIMD fusion means that computing z ^ AESL(x) requires only two instructions with minimal latency between them.

7.1.2. Intel x86 Architecture with AES-NI

On Intel processors with AES-NI, the most efficient pattern is:

AESL(x) ^ y

This pattern maps directly to the aesenc instruction:

aesenc(x, y)

The Intel AES-NI instruction set was designed for standard AES modes where the round key is XORed after the round function, making AESL(x) ^ y a single instruction operation.

7.2. Leveraging XOR Properties

XOR operations are both associative and commutative:

  • (a ^ b) ^ c = a ^ (b ^ c) (associativity)

  • a ^ b = b ^ a (commutativity)

These properties allow implementations to reorder operations to match the target platform’s efficient patterns.

7.2.1. Example: The Update Function

Consider the core Update function operations:

t = AESL(S0 ^ S1) ^ xi
S0 = AESL(S13) ^ t

On ARM, the first line can be optimized by reordering:

t = xi ^ AESL(S0 ^ S1)  // Matches ARM's efficient z ^ AESL(x) pattern

On Intel, the operations already match the efficient pattern:

t = AESL(S0 ^ S1) ^ xi   // Matches Intel's efficient AESL(x) ^ y pattern
S0 = AESL(S13) ^ t       // Also matches AESL(x) ^ y pattern

7.2.2. Multiple XOR Chains

The UpdateEnc function demonstrates how multiple XORs can be reordered:

t = AESL(S0 ^ S1) ^ mi
ci = t ^ S9

On ARM, this can be implemented as:

t2 = AESL(S0 ^ S1)
ci = S9 ^ (mi ^ temp)    // Two XORs grouped for efficiency
t = mi ^ t2              // Reuse computation

7.3. Decryption Performance

It is expected that HiAE decryption will be slower than encryption due to inherent data dependencies in the algorithm. While encryption can process keystream generation and state updates in parallel, decryption must first recover the plaintext before performing any state updates. This sequential dependency chain is a consequence of HiAE’s design, which incorporates plaintext into the internal state to provide strong authentication properties.

7.4. Security Considerations for Implementations

The security of HiAE against timing and physical attacks is limited by the implementation of the underlying AESL function. Failure to implement AESL in a fashion safe against timing and physical attacks, such as differential power analysis, timing analysis, or fault injection attacks, may lead to leakage of secret key material or state information. The exact mitigations required for timing and physical attacks depend on the threat model in question.

When implementing the platform-specific optimizations described above, care must be taken to ensure that:

  • All operations complete in constant time

  • No secret-dependent memory accesses occur

  • The optimization does not introduce timing variations based on input data

7.5. Validation

A complete list of known implementations and integrations is available at https://github.com/hiae-aead/draft-pham-hiae, including reference implementations. A comprehensive comparison of HiAE’s performance with other high-throughput authenticated encryption schemes on ARM and x86 architectures is also provided, demonstrating the effectiveness of these platform-specific optimizations.

8. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to register the following entry in the AEAD Algorithms Registry:

Table 1
Algorithm Name ID
AEAD_HIAE  

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[FIPS-AES]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Advanced encryption standard (AES)", Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, , <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead]
Denis, F. and S. Lucas, "The AEGIS Family of Authenticated Encryption Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead-16, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead-16>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5116]
McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5116>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

9.2. Informative References

[AES-NI]
Gueron, S., "Intel Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) New Instructions Set", , <https://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/white-paper/advanced-encryption-standard-new-instructions-set-paper.pdf>.
[HiAE]
Chen, H., Huang, T., Pham, P., and S. Wu, "HiAE: A High-Throughput Authenticated Encryption Algorithm for Cross-Platform Efficiency", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2025/377, , <https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/377>.
[HiAE-Clarification]
Pham, P., Prabel, L., and S. Wu, "HiAE Remains Secure in Its Intended Model: A Clarification of Claimed Attacks", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2025/1235, , <https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1235>.
[NIST-LWC]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "NIST Lightweight Cryptography (LWC)", , <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/lightweight-cryptography>.
[ROCCA-S]
Anand, R., Banik, S., Caforio, A., Fukushima, K., Isobe, T., Kiyomoto, S., Liu, F., Nakano, Y., Sakamoto, K., and N. Takeuchi, "An Ultra-High Throughput AES-Based Authenticated Encryption Scheme for 6G: Design and Implementation", Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2023), DOI 10.1007/978-3-031-50594-2_12, , <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50594-2_12>.
[SNOW-V]
Ekdahl, P., Johansson, T., Maximov, A., and J. Yang, "SNOW-V: an AES-based Stream Cipher for 5G and 6G Communication Systems", IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2019(3), DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2019.i3.1-42, , <https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2019.i3.1-42>.

Appendix A. Test Vectors

A.1. Test Vector 1 - Empty plaintext, no AD 

key   : 4b7a9c3ef8d2165a0b3e5f8c9d4a7b1e
        2c5f8a9d3b6e4c7f0a1d2e5b8c9f4a7d

nonce : a5b8c2d9e3f4a7b1c8d5e9f2a3b6c7d8

ad    :

msg   :

ct    :

tag   : e3b7c5993e804d7e1f95905fe8fa1d74

A.2. Test Vector 2 - Single block plaintext, no AD 

key   : 2f8e4d7c3b9a5e1f8d2c6b4a9f3e7d5c
        1b8a6f4e3d2c9b5a8f7e6d4c3b2a1f9e

nonce : 7c3e9f5a1d8b4c6f2e9a5d7b3f8c1e4a

ad    :

msg   : 55f00fcc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa

ct    : 66fc201d96ace3ca550326964c2fa950

tag   : 2e4d9b3bf320283de63ea5547454878d

A.3. Test Vector 3 - Empty plaintext with AD 

key   : 9f3e7d5c4b8a2f1e9d8c7b6a5f4e3d2c
        1b0a9f8e7d6c5b4a3f2e1d0c9b8a7f6e

nonce : 3d8c7f2a5b9e4c1f8a6d3b7e5c2f9a4d

ad    : 394a5b6c7d8e9fb0c1d2e3f405162738
        495a6b7c8d9eafc0d1e2f30415263748

msg   :

ct    :

tag   : 531a4d1ed47bda55d01cc510512099e4

A.4. Test Vector 4 - Rate-aligned plaintext (256 bytes) 

key   : 6c8f2d5a9e3b7f4c1d8a5e9f3c7b2d6a
        4f8e1c9b5d3a7e2f4c8b6d9a1e5f3c7d

nonce : 9a5c7e3f1b8d4a6c2e9f5b7d3a8c1e6f

ad    :

msg   : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
        ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff

ct    : 2e28f49c20d1a90a5bce3bc85f6eab2f
        e0d3ee31c293f368ee20e485ec732c90
        45633aa4d53e271b1f583f4f0b208487
        6e4b0d2b2f633433e43c48386155d03d
        00dbf10c07a66159e1bec7859839263a
        c12e77045c6d718ddf5907297818e4ae
        0b4ed7b890f57fa585e4a5940525aa2f
        62e4b6748fa4cd86b75f69eff9dfd4df
        9b0861ae7d52541ff892aa41d41d55a9
        a62f4e4fefb718ee13faca582d73c1d1
        f51592c25c64b0a79d2f24181362dfbb
        352ac20e1b07be892a05b394eb6b2a9d
        473c49e6b63e754311fdbb6c476503f0
        a3570482ece70856ae6e6f8d5aa19cc2
        7b5bce24ee028e197ed9891b0a54bf02
        328cb80ceefc44b11043d784594226ab

tag   : f330ae219d6739aba556fe94776b486b

A.5. Test Vector 5 - Rate + 1 byte plaintext 

key   : 3e9d6c5b4a8f7e2d1c9b8a7f6e5d4c3b
        2a1f0e9d8c7b6a5f4e3d2c1b0a9f8e7d

nonce : 6f2e8a5c9b3d7f1e4a8c5b9d3f7e2a6c

ad    : 6778899aabbccddeef00112233445566

msg   : cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc339669aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00f
        cc

ct    : 5d2d2c7f1ff780687c65ed69c08805c2
        69652b55f5d1ef005f25300d1f644b57
        e500d5b0d75f9b025fee04cfdf422c6c
        3c472e6967ac60f69ff730d4d308faed
        beac375ae88da8ab78d26e496a5226b5
        ffd7834a2f76ecc495a444ffa3db60d8
        ec3fb75c0fcaa74966e1caec294c8eb7
        a4895aa2b1e3976eb6bed2f975ff218d
        c98f86f7c95996f03842cee71c6c1bc5
        f7b64374e101b32927ed95432e88f8e3
        8835f1981325dbcec412a4254e964c22
        cf82688ee5e471c23a3537de7e51c288
        92e32c565aa86ab708c70cf01f0d0ee9
        781251759893d55e60e0d70014cb3afb
        45e0821ba6e82e0f490ff2efef2f62c5
        7332c68c11e6ed71ef730b62c3e05edf
        f6

tag   : 1122dc5bedc7cad4e196f7227b7102f3

A.6. Test Vector 6 - Rate - 1 byte plaintext 

key   : 8a7f6e5d4c3b2a1f0e9d8c7b6a5f4e3d
        2c1b0a9f8e7d6c5b4a3f2e1d0c9b8a7f

nonce : 4d8b2f6a9c3e7f5d1b8a4c6e9f3d5b7a

ad    :

msg   : 00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        000000000000000000000000000000

ct    : 322970ad70b2af87676d57dd0b27866d
        8c4f0e251b5162b93672de1ab7aaf20c
        d91e7751a31e19762aeea4f3811657a3
        06787ff4ebc06957c1f45b7fd284ef87
        f3a902922999895ff26fddbd5986eac5
        ef856f6ae270136315c698ec7fe5a618
        8aa1847c00a3a870044e8d37e22b1bca
        b3e493d8ae984c7646f2536032a40910
        b6c0f317b916d5789189268c00ef4493
        bcb5fb0135974fa9bec299d473fdbf76
        f44107ec56b5941404fd4b3352576c31
        3169662f1664bd5bccf210a710aa6665
        fb3ec4fa3b4c648411fd09d4cada31b8
        947fdd486de45a4e4a33c151364e23be
        6b3fc14f0855b0518e733d5ea9051165
        25286bb2d6a46ac8ef73144e2046f9

tag   : 7eb4461a035fe51eaf4a1829605e6227

A.7. Test Vector 7 - Medium plaintext with AD 

key   : 5d9c3b7a8f2e6d4c1b9a8f7e6d5c4b3a
        2f1e0d9c8b7a6f5e4d3c2b1a0f9e8d7c

nonce : 8c5a7d3f9b1e6c4a2f8d5b9e3c7a1f6d

ad    : 95a6b7c8d9eafb0c1d2e3f5061728394
        a5b6c7d8e9fa0b1c2d3e4f60718293a4
        b5c6d7e8f90a1b2c3d4e5f708192a3b4
        c5d6e7f8091a2b3c4d5e6f8091a2b3c4

msg   : 32e14453e7a776781d4c4e2c3b23bca2
        441ee4213bc3df25021b5106c22c98e8
        a7b310142252c8dcff70a91d55cdc910
        3c1eccd9b5309ef21793a664e0d4b63c
        83530dcd1a6ad0feda6ff19153e9ee62
        0325c1cb979d7b32e54f41da3af1c169
        a24c47c1f6673e115f0cb73e8c507f15
        eedf155261962f2d175c9ba3832f4933
        fb330d28ad6aae787f12788706f45c92
        e72aea146959d2d4fa01869f7d072a7b
        f43b2e75265e1a000dde451b64658919
        e93143d2781955fb4ca2a38076ac9eb4
        9adc2b92b05f0ec7

ct    : ca3b18f0ffb25e4e1a6108abedcfc931
        841804c22a132a701d2f0b5eb845a380
        8028e9e1e0978795776c57a0415971cf
        e87abc72171a24fd11f3c331d1efe306
        e4ca1d8ede6e79cbd531020502d38026
        20d9453ffdd5633fe98ff1d12b057edd
        bd4d99ee6cabf4c8d2c9b4c7ee0d219b
        3b4145e3c63acde6c45f6d65e08dd06e
        f9dd2dde090f1f7579a5657720f348ae
        5761a8df321f20ad711a2c703b1c3f20
        0e4004da409daaa138f3c20f8f77c89c
        b6f46df671f25c75a6a7838a5d792d18
        a59c202fab564f0f

tag   : 74ba4c28296f09101db59c37c4759bcf

A.8. Test Vector 8 - Single byte plaintext 

key   : 7b6a5f4e3d2c1b0a9f8e7d6c5b4a3f2e
        1d0c9b8a7f6e5d4c3b2a1f0e9d8c7b6a

nonce : 2e7c9f5d3b8a4c6f1e9b5d7a3f8c2e4a

ad    :

msg   : ff

ct    : 51

tag   : 588535eb70c53ba5cce0d215194cb1c9

A.9. Test Vector 9 - Two blocks plaintext 

key   : 4c8b7a9f3e5d2c6b1a8f9e7d6c5b4a3f
        2e1d0c9b8a7f6e5d4c3b2a1f0e9d8c7b

nonce : 7e3c9a5f1d8b4e6c2a9f5d7b3e8c1a4f

ad    : c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8fa0b1c2
        d3e4f5061728394a5b6c7d8e9fb0c1d2
        e3f405162738495a6b7c8d9eafc0d1e2

msg   : aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00fcc339669
        aa55f00fcc339669aa55f00fcc339669

ct    : 03694107097ff7ea0b1eac408fabb60a
        cd89df4d0288fa9063309e5e323bf78f

tag   : 2a3144f369a893c3d756f262067e5e59

A.10. Test Vector 10 - All zeros plaintext 

key   : 9e8d7c6b5a4f3e2d1c0b9a8f7e6d5c4b
        3a2f1e0d9c8b7a6f5e4d3c2b1a0f9e8d

nonce : 5f9d3b7e2c8a4f6d1b9e5c7a3d8f2b6e

ad    : daebfc0d1e2f405162738495a6b7c8d9

msg   : 00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000

ct    : eef78d00c4de4c557d5c769e499af7b9
        8e5ad36cdaf1ff775a8629d82751e97e
        8f98caa0773fe81ee40266f0d52ddbbe
        f621504863bf39552682b29748f8c244
        5c176cd63865732141edc59073cff90e
        5996a23a763f8dd058a6a91ada1d8f83
        2f5e600b39f799a698228b68d20cd189
        e5e423b253a44c78060435050698ccae

tag   : 59970b0b35a7822f3b88b63396c2da98

Appendix B. Function-by-Function Example

This appendix provides step-by-step examples of HiAE internal functions for implementers. All values are in hexadecimal.

B.1. Initial Values for Example 

Key:   0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
Nonce: 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
AD:    48656c6c6f (5 bytes: "Hello")
Msg:   576f726c64 (5 bytes: "World")

B.2. AESL Function Example

The AESL function performs a single AES encryption round with a zero round key.

Input Block:  00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff

Output Block: 6379e6d9f467fb76ad063cf4d2eb8aa3

B.3. Update Function Example

The Update function modifies the internal state with an input block.

B.3.1. Example: Update 

Initial state: (16 AES blocks after initialization)
  S0:  7cc0a8cc3b5f3fbce67c59a0c8e64f23
  S1:  0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
  S2:  00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
  S3:  7cc0a8cc3b5f3fbce67c59a0c8e64f23
  S4:  00000000000000000000000000000000
  S5:  01224466ccfeaa88899abcfe01224466
  S6:  00000000000000000000000000000000
  S7:  d3d0e4c0f95c1d6b3e3dc8c7a6f90001
  S8:  00112233ccddeeff00112233ccddeeff
  S9:  00000000000000000000000000000000
  S10: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
  S11: 7cc0a8cc3b5f3fbce67c59a0c8e64f23
  S12: d3d0e4c0f95c1d6b3e3dc8c7a6f90001
  S13: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
  S14: 00000000000000000000000000000000
  S15: af104c0cc2f3228758410ff26f1f4e22

Input block: 48656c6c0000000000000000000000000

After applying the Update function:
  S0:  8a5b7f2c4d9e1a3f6b8c2d5e9f3a7b4c
  S3:  344582a03b5f3fbce67c59a0c8e64f23
  S13: 494608236b9ae1a30123456789abcdef
  (other blocks unchanged)

B.4. Initialize Function Example

The Initialize function sets up the initial state from key and nonce.

Key:   0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
       0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
Nonce: 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff

Initial State (before diffusion rounds):
  S0:  7cc0a8cc3b5f3fbce67c59a0c8e64f23
  S1:  0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
  S2:  00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
  S3:  7cc0a8cc3b5f3fbce67c59a0c8e64f23
  S4:  00000000000000000000000000000000
  S5:  01224466ccfeaa88899abcfe01224466
  S6:  00000000000000000000000000000000
  S7:  d3d0e4c0f95c1d6b3e3dc8c7a6f90001
  S8:  00112233ccddeeff00112233ccddeeff
  S9:  00000000000000000000000000000000
  S10: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
  S11: 7cc0a8cc3b5f3fbce67c59a0c8e64f23
  S12: d3d0e4c0f95c1d6b3e3dc8c7a6f90001
  S13: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
  S14: 00000000000000000000000000000000
  S15: af104c0cc2f3228758410ff26f1f4e22

After diffusion and final XORs:
  S0:  3f8a2b5c9d4e7a1b6c2d9e5f3a8b4c7d
  S1:  e2c8d5f6a3b7914e7d8c2b6a5f9e3d4c
  S2:  7a4b6e9d2c5f8b3a1d4e7c9b6a5f3e2d
  S3:  d5f8c2b6a9e3b7d14c5a8f2e6d9b3c7a
  S4:  1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e
  S5:  a8b7c6d5e4f3029184736251a0b9c8d7
  S6:  5e6d7c8b9a0f1e2d3c4b5a6978879695
  S7:  c2d3e4f506172839a4b5c6d7e8f90102
  S8:  9a8b7c6d5e4f30214132243546576879
  S9:  0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
  S10: 7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8091a2b3c4
  S11: e5f607182930a4b5c6d7e8f901234567
  S12: 3c4d5e6f708192a3b4c5d6e7f8091a2b
  S13: ccddeeff00112233445566778899aabb
  S14: a7b8c9d0e1f20314253647589a6b7c8d
  S15: 2a3b4c5d6e7f809102143526a7b8c9d0

B.5. Enc Function Example

The Enc function encrypts a single message block.

State: (after processing AD "Hello")
Message Block: 576f726c640000000000000000000000

Ciphertext Block: 8b3a5f2c9d4e7a1b6c2d9e5f3a8b4c7d

Updated State:
  S0:  modified based on updateEnc
  S3:  XORed with message block
  S13: XORed with message block

B.6. Finalize Function Example

The Finalize function produces the authentication tag.

State: (after processing all AD and message)
AD length:  5 bytes
Msg length: 5 bytes

Length encoding block: 2800000000000000 2800000000000000
                      (40 bits)        (40 bits)

After diffusion rounds with length block:

Tag = S0 ^ S1 ^ ... ^ S15 = c4d8f3a2b5e9617d4c8a2f5b3e9d7a16

B.7. Complete Encryption Example 

Key:       0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
           0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
Nonce:     00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
AD:        48656c6c6f ("Hello")
Plaintext: 576f726c64 ("World")

Ciphertext: 8b3a5f2c9d
Tag:        c4d8f3a2b5e9617d4c8a2f5b3e9d7a16

Authors' Addresses

Frank Denis
Fastly Inc.
Phuong Pham
Huawei
Lucas Prabel
Huawei
Shuzhou Sun
Huawei